


Conclusion

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The Buddha Party: How the People's Republic of China Works to Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism

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Abstract and Keywords

This chapter summarizes the discussion and returns to some of the themes introduced at the beginning. It discusses how pervasive belief in the official narrative is among Han Chinese, but how it has generally failed to resonate among Tibetans. It compares this belief to the persistence of conviction among Christian fundamentalists and shows how empirical evidence and contradictory information from historical sources generally has little effect on Chinese. It describes who many actively self-censor and cling to the official narrative. It concludes with observations regarding how China's leaders appear to sincerely embrace these dogmas and that they affect relations with other countries.

Keywords: Buddhism, Tibet, Propaganda, history

Propaganda does not deceive people; it merely helps them to deceive themselves.

Ungrateful Little Brothers and Sisters

When Chinese travel overseas for study or tourism, they often find that Tibetans they meet are not patriotic like the ones back home. Chinese greet them as fellow citizens of the Motherland and expect a response of shared belonging—and perhaps a bit of gratitude for their liberation and economic and cultural upliftment. More often than not, these overseas Tibetans inform them that they feel no kinship with Chinese and regard them as alien imperialists who invaded their country and enslaved its people. This is a profound shock to Chinese raised with the images presented in official discourses regarding Tibet. The anti-imperialist ideology that is inculcated in citizens of the PRC from birth makes them particularly sensitive to such accusations, and for people who are convinced that their nation is a benevolent promoter of global harmony that never uses force against other countries the notion that some of those others regard them as far worse than the evil imperialists of modern Chinese myths is an unwelcome revelation.

Most Chinese never visit Tibet, but it features prominently in their worldview, and belief in the “peaceful liberation” and subsequent civilizing activities of their forbears is encoded in popular entertainment, public discourses, and the educational curriculum all over China. When they turn on the television, singing, dancing minorities are a recurrent theme: they wear unflagging smiles, and the spontaneous, uncoerced patriotic sentiments they express bolster Han self-esteem and maintain the conviction that the minorities love and revere them. The cognitive dissonance created by overseas Tibetans who have a radically different view is easily explained (p.210) away: they have come under the influence of foreign imperialists, who have converted them from patriots to splittists. The PRC’s information industry relentlessly proclaims that imperialists work ceaselessly to undermine China and create divisions among its people, and so this is the only plausible explanation when overseas Tibetans lose their way and propound falsehoods about their Motherland. Tibet is closely linked with Chinese notions of national pride/national humiliation, and so Han are particularly sensitive to suggestions that the official line is false.

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This sort of reaction is the goal of propaganda: to create widespread and implicit acceptance of its ideology so entrenched that no counter-narrative can dislodge it. Ellul explains that propaganda is most effective when propagandees want to embrace the message, which provides epistemic security.² Propaganda disseminates totalizing myths that explain the world and reduce complex situations to simple slogans and monolithic myths. These have a strong emotional appeal for people with whom they resonate, and they tend to push aside conflicting discourses that threaten the certainties they engender. They “displace from the conscious all that is not related to it. Such an image pushes man to action precisely because it includes all that he feels is good, just, and true.”³ The myths serve to confirm deeply held prejudices and reassure people that they are justified in holding them.⁴

Selling the Product in a Global Information Marketplace

China’s information apparatus, which controls the media and academia, systematically falsifies and rewrites history, anthropology, and religion, and the authorities assume that they can replicate their success in creating an environment of pseudo-truths in their own country by employing the same techniques in a global context. The PRC’s Tibet information strategy rests on the premise that this is feasible, and to this end the government has unleashed a propaganda barrage that expends vast amounts of money and is conjoined with China’s growing economic leverage.⁵

The PRC propaganda apparatus has a patchy record of influencing foreign opinion with respect to Tibet, but its dogmas are widely embraced by the citizens of China, particularly the Han. This is not merely the result of a totalitarian state forcing people to adopt ideas against their will: this endeavor involves active participation on the part of its target audience. As Foucault notes, when discourses are widely accepted as part of a society’s

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“regime of truth,” there is no one person or organization that has complete control over this process.⁶ For all of its vast resources and its pervasive power over media outlets, academic publications, and the Internet, the propaganda industry has experienced a number of failures in attempts to persuade Chinese



Figure C.1. A prayer wheel that contains treatises by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin

people of ideas that they find particularly objectionable. The success of the program to convince its audience of the truth of the government’s claims regarding Tibet is made possible by the fact that Han want to believe them and actively practice self-censorship to shut (p.212) out competing counter-discourses. Chinese students have walked out of my lectures when I presented information that called their convictions into question, and I have been told by student delegations that I must stop spreading these lies because they “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” This is a common experience for Tibet specialists.⁷

The scenario is similar to a paleontologist describing excavations of dinosaur bones to a group of biblical fundamentalists who believe that God created the earth 4,000 years ago. Following a lecture I delivered at Harvard University in 2008 on my research into Tibet-related

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propaganda, a group of Chinese students challenged an offhand remark that in nine months of traveling and working in minority areas of the PRC I had never seen anyone singing or dancing. They wanted to know where I had been; I replied that I had made two trips to the Tibet Autonomous Region, traveled across Xinjiang, and had been to Gansu, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Sichuan in minority areas, and no one had ever spontaneously launched into public singing and dancing like the carefree ethnics on China's television screens. The students indicated that they regarded this as highly dubious and suggested that I must not be particularly observant.⁸

Another standard response is an angry demand to know: "Who's paying you?" The PRC media regularly reports that the Dalai Clique and other enemies of China are well-funded and travel the globe doling out piles of cash to mendacious foreigners willing to propound false slanders against the Motherland. When I first encountered this question, I reflected on my meetings with representatives of the CTA: I always seem to end up paying the bills for meals or coffee, and I have to purchase their publications. When Chinese government representatives invite me to meals, they always pay, and they have supplied hundreds of free books, magazines, and DVDs. Regrettably, the Dalai Clique has not made any offers to share its imperialist-supplied wealth.

Similar encounters are a common experience for researchers who focus on Tibet. Chinese students generally attend our lectures expecting that because we are experts in the field we must have reached the same conclusions as their government's Central Publicity Department, which were repeated in their school textbooks, and that they will hear comforting corroborations that will dispel the calumnies propounded by foreign anti-China bigots and the "Free Tibet" supporters who are their well-meaning but ignorant dupes. Their beliefs are bolstered by the vast output of materials their government produces that encode its Tibet dogmas. No ambiguity or doubt appears in these works.

(p.213) The resources devoted to Tibet-related information in the PRC are immense: a two-volume bibliography published in the 1990s lists thousands of publications released from 1949 to 1995, and the pace of production since then has increased substantially.⁹ During my trips to China, I accumulated materials that now fill several shelves in my library, and as this

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book was being written another two boxes (unrequested) were delivered by the Chinese Embassy.¹⁰ My computer hard drive stores hundreds of publications from PRC academic journals, and these are a small fraction of PRC Tibetologists' output. Every month parcels arrive containing the latest Chinese publications on Tibet. All of these are free, and the books are often lavishly produced, with high production standards and expensive color photographs (and relentlessly monolithic contents).

Selective Histories

In *The Fat Years*, Chan Koonchung describes an Orwellian scenario in the near future in which China is the sole superpower and other nations approach it as supplicants. The central theme is the Party's successful suppression of any memory of a period of unrest during which China was beset with "uprisings, lootings, food shortages, martial law ... and nobody remembered any of this." Chen focuses on the selectivity of historical remembrance in modern China: "We're still talking about the Opium War, but we forgot about the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution."¹¹ Julia Lovell, who translated the novel, comments that Chan confronts "the marriage of mass acquiescence" and "political intimidation" that is extensively employed in contemporary China. Chan depicts a group of dissidents who are seeking to recover the truth of the missing events. They kidnap a senior Party official and try to force him to reveal what really happened. Instead, he delivers a defiant soliloquy about how the government "totally rewrote the history" of the forgotten events; this was enabled by the people themselves, who "fear chaos more than dictatorship."¹²

Rewriting history has become easier than ever with the proliferation and widespread use of mass media and the Internet. The PRC's propaganda apparatus has embraced modern technology and makes extensive use of the Internet in disseminating its message. In 1999 George W. Bush enthused: "Imagine if the Internet took hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread!"¹³ It has taken hold, and it has proven to be a powerful tool for controlling opinion. As Anne-Marie Brady notes, far from being (p.214) a liberating technology, "the Internet is an extremely effective means of social control for the Chinese authorities."¹⁴ In contemporary China,

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television is also an important tool for disseminating Party messages and influencing public opinion.

Propaganda has been a central concern of the PRC since its inception. During the Mao era, propaganda was disseminated throughout the society, into every city and village, neighborhood and family. Local organizations were given the task of holding meetings and informing people of the latest government missives and directives, and trucks with loudspeakers mounted on them cruised through the streets, blaring slogans and exhorting citizens to intensify their revolutionary zeal and make greater efforts toward the country's prosperity.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Party emphasized small group discussions in which people would gather for meetings led by communist cadres. Their task was to instruct their audiences and urge them to repeat what they had learned and apply it to their own situations so that they would come to recognize the truths contained in Mao's words and the pronouncements of their politically awakened leaders. Susan Blum comments that during this time

people were persuaded by slogans written and oral, by stories, by lectures, by meetings, by social pressure. Accounts of the 1950s and early 1960s give the impression of earnest, endless talking, so that the enlightened ones who possessed the truth could persuade those who had not yet encountered it.¹⁵

Ellul also notes the effectiveness of small groups for propaganda.¹⁶ The message can be tailored and responses gauged by leaders. This format serves to directly inculcate audiences with the dominant group's myths and ideology. Ellul notes that this process often goes along with assaults on traditional social structures and attempts to diminish the emotional hold of family and kinship ties. This was a pervasive tactic in the remaking of Chinese society during the Cultural Revolution, which was designed to reconfigure social structures in accordance with Maoist socialism. The Communists also eliminated the old educational system and replaced it with a new one in which children were comprehensively indoctrinated into the government's socialist regime of truth. As Ellul notes, this sort of propaganda is difficult to achieve because of the vast resources required and

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the large numbers of people who have to be (p.215) incorporated into the educational effort, but it is “exceptionally efficient through its meticulous encirclement of everybody, through the effective participation of all present, and through their public declarations of adherence.”¹⁷

Today “study sessions” are still encouraged (and as discussed in chapter 3, the format is being replicated in the “patriotic education” campaign in Tibet), but in the absence of a coherent ideology and in light of the move toward a market economy socialist rhetoric is no longer particularly convincing, and it clashes with actual practice. The main message now is that patriotism is the core social value that everyone must cultivate, and this is narrowly linked to reverence for the Party. A recurring message is that “without the Communist Party there would be no New China.”¹⁸ This is endlessly repeated; it encodes a number of subtexts, including the notion of a persistent foreign threat to China that can only be thwarted by the Party and the conclusion that the entire country must steadfastly unite behind its leaders. The CCP is depicted as the guardian of China’s ancient civilization, the bulwark of defense against social disharmony, and the force that drives the country’s surging economy. Through its skillful guidance China has again moved to a position of power and influence internationally, but this will only be maintained if the people are resolute and adhere to the government’s guidelines and support its policies. Questioning and doubt breed disharmony and are the beginning of chaos.

The CCP’s leaders clearly want the public to believe their anti-foreign rhetoric, and its recurrence in official speeches at their gatherings indicates at least that those who deliver them think that many of their colleagues are in agreement. But the internal logic is incoherent, and actual practice contravenes this trope. If the government’s depiction of the external (and internal) threat were accurate, then every significant problem that the PRC has faced since its inception (except, perhaps for natural disasters) has been caused by foreign intrigues. This would imply that the country is deeply infiltrated by spies and saboteurs and that they have been highly successful in recruiting Chinese to work for them.

Moreover, in spite of their multitude of schemes, none have ever been caught or charged, and no Chinese collaborators have been forced to reveal evidence of their handlers’ guilt.

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The level of tradecraft would be remarkable, and it would be one of the most successful conspiracies in history. It has intrigued throughout China for more than sixty years, and its operatives have managed to evade PRC law enforcement. In addition, because few foreigners are permitted to live in China for extended periods of time, short-term residents (p.216) must have formed stable networks and passed them on to others without serious disruption, and the spies must have been able to circumvent the banking system and avoid detection of the vast amounts of money that would have been required to bribe Chinese agents and fund clandestine activities.

Despite the conspiracy's extensive reach and apparently massive funding, no serious effort has ever been announced by PRC leaders to catch the culprits. If authorities in the United States, for example, became aware of such a powerful network of subversives, the full resources of homeland security and law enforcement would be mobilized to root it out and arrest those involved. Financial investigators would work to uncover the money trail and stop the flow of funds. Although PRC authorities want their audiences to accept the notion that foreigners are working to destroy the country and create divisions among its people, after declaring that they have definitive proof of a massive and highly effective clandestine network, there is no apparent follow up.

Propaganda theorists emphasize the importance of a frightening conspiracy for mobilizing the public and preserving the power of ruling regimes, even if it is fictitious. Another requirement is an enemy, a dangerous, scheming monster who can serve as the face of the threat faced by the nation. The United States and other Western nations have menacing bearded jihadists who brandish swords and vow to behead infidels, and stereotyped evil Nazis were a staple of World War II propaganda. The PRC has the Dalai Lama, but they have failed to represent him effectively as a poster monk for foreign intrigues. He is a smiling, self-effacing elderly man who travels the world advising people to be nice to each other and who works to promote world peace. In PRC depictions of him, he secretly schemes and plots with his foreign masters to divide China, but the populace is assured that he is utterly ineffectual. His designs are always thwarted by the vigilance of the CCP and its law enforcement bodies, and in the end he ends up raging impotently at his inability to change the course

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of history and return to the dictatorial power he once enjoyed. He is a sort of Wyle E. Coyote kind of villain who concocts elaborate stratagems to foment rebellion and destroy Buddhism, but nothing he does has the slightest chance of succeeding.

Lies That Blind

The notion of foreign menace is interwoven with admonitions regarding the need for vigilance and resistance. They call for a group effort led by the Party. By implication, this is one reason why the persistent tendency (p.217) of Tibetans and other minorities to reject the government's attempts to represent them is perceived as a danger to the entire nation. They may be a miniscule part of the population in terms of numbers, but the territories they inhabit constitute 40% of the PRC's landmass. A recurring official trope warns that if foreigners were to succeed in splitting minority areas from the Motherland the country would be fatally weakened and vulnerable to attack. The very survival of the Central Kingdom requires that the indigenes' fissiparous tendencies be countered and their beliefs altered to conform to the Party's requirements.

Fear is a persistent theme: anxiety about the undermining of national security and territorial integrity that would result if the Communist Party were to lose power, the menace of external enemies who are working to curtail China's advance. Another important element is first-hand accounts of maltreatment and liberation by former "serfs," "slaves," and "prisoners," who "speak bitterness." They recount their experiences at the hands of oppressive aristocrats and lamas and proclaim their gratitude to the PLA and PRC for their liberation. These presentations have been extremely effective in solidifying public opinion because they appear to be the spontaneous, heartfelt sentiments of people who endured horrific suffering and whose expressions of gratitude seem plausible in light of their past torments.

Nuance and ambiguity are expunged from these narratives: characters like former slave owners, aristocrats, or foreign imperialists are starkly portrayed as implacably evil, while soldiers of the PLA or communist cadres are selfless and noble, concerned only with the people's welfare. These messages are often accompanied by graphic photographs of

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people who were purportedly physically mutilated and tortured. The remoteness and inaccessibility of Tibet aid in the propaganda effort because travel to the region is time-consuming and expensive. For most Chinese, it would require significant investment of time and money to go there, locate the subjects of these stories, and attempt to ascertain the validity of their depictions. The media works in the service of the Party, and so there is no possibility that independent reporters might investigate; if someone were to do so, their findings would not be published in China.

Enemies including the Dalai Lama and Uyghur leader Rabia Kadeer are singled out for personal attacks. Name-calling of the most extreme sort is a recurrent aspect of these discourses. The evil deeds of China's foes are recounted, and people are urged to take sides. The Communist Party and its enlightened leadership stand on one side, resolutely protecting the (p.218) country from external threats and adroitly managing its economy. Beyond the borders, a malign horde of "splittists" and "hostile foreign powers" lurks, ceaselessly working to undermine its efforts. These tactics are the standard tools of propaganda. Harold Lasswell, who argued that propaganda is essential for maintaining stability in modern states, advised that

a newer and subtler instrument must weld thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope. A new flame must burn out the canker of dissent and temper the steel of bellicose enthusiasm. The name of this new hammer and anvil of social solidarity is propaganda.¹⁹

When effectively constructed and widely disseminated to a citizenry that is inclined to accept it, propaganda can be highly effective in creating a shared mindset and spurring patriotic sentiments. In China, these serve the instrumental purpose of keeping the Communist Party in power, and those who accept them are more likely to overlook its failings. Messages relating to Tibet include false dichotomies presented as obvious facts: if China had not forcibly annexed the region, Tibet would have remained medieval; if the Communist Party were to be supplanted, the country would fall into chaos and be invaded by foreigners; if religious believers were left to their own

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consciences regarding belief and practice, this would devastate the economy and create social divisions.²⁰

During the Mao era, there was a primary emphasis on Marxist revolution, but as the Party has moved from an agenda of restructuring society to ruling the country, the emphasis has shifted to maintaining its control and power. PRC leaders still punctuate their public pronouncements with socialist rhetoric, but they are no longer aiming to promote ongoing revolution: now the citizenry is urged to oppose radical change and trust in the wisdom of the CCP. The Party is presented as a collective of outstanding economic managers, and the people should be content to let them handle matters of state, national defense, and the economy.

The leaders themselves may control the propaganda apparatus, but they are also influenced by their own rhetoric. Their angry responses to the chants of pro-Tibet demonstrators seldom appear scripted or false; they genuinely believe the stories they disseminate. This belief affects how they interact with foreigners, many of whom hold differing convictions. Tibet is a particularly sensitive issue for both the PRC's leaders and its citizenry. (p.219) Enormous effort is made to change the opinions of foreigners, and when this is unsuccessful the response is often frustration and affront. Few foreigners truly understand the dynamics of these beliefs, and even fewer accept their underlying premises. In light of these factors, it is probable that the "Tibet issue" will continue to create antagonisms between China and the rest of the world.

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Notes:

(1.) Hoffer (1996: 144).

(2.) Ellul (1979: 103). Cunningham (2002: 146) adds that "the machinery of mass persuasion ... works because it can rely upon (and reinforce) a willingness to believe and be persuaded by the propagandee." And conversely, when an audience is strongly committed to opposing the message, it is very difficult to create acceptance.

(3.) Ellul (1973: 31).

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(4.) Ellul (1973: 162). He refers to this process as “crystallization”: “Under the influence of propaganda certain latent drives that are vague, unclear, and often without any particular objective suddenly become powerful, direct, and precise ... prejudices that exist without any event become greatly reinforced and hardened by propaganda; the individual is told that he is *right* in harboring them ... the stronger the conflicts in a society, the stronger the prejudices, and propaganda that intensifies conflicts simultaneously intensifies prejudices in this very fashion.”

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(5.) An example of the reach of this effort and the resources devoted to it is a twelve-page glossy supplement in the *Daily Times* of Malawai entitled “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet” that appeared in April 2009. This was packaged as a genuine news story, and no mention was made in the paper that it was really a paid advertisement by the PRC. The piece was expensively produced, and one can only imagine why the PRC regarded influencing Malawi public opinion on Tibet to be worth the cost. *China Digital Times* (<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/01/nicholas-bequelin-chinas-new-propaganda-machine-going-global/>) has collected articles on this global initiative, which has largely gone unreported in the international press. An article in the *Wall Street Journal* on January 29, 2009 (“China’s New Propaganda Machine Going Global”) refers to “a multibillion dollar media expansion overseas.” It comments: “The sheer scale of these plans raises many questions about China’s long-term objectives.”

The power of Chinese money is also influencing the US entertainment industry. This has been noted in a number of news reports, including one by Steven Zeitchik and Jonathan Landreth published in the *Los Angeles Times* on June 12, 2012, entitled “Hollywood Gripped by Pressure System from China.” They note that, either on their own initiative or under pressure from Chinese investors in their productions, movie executives have remade films that contained negative images of Chinese and have changed others to recast Chinese characters as heroes. They point to several movies in which this has occurred, including “Battleship,” “Salmon Fishing in the Yemen,” “2012,” and the remake of “Red Dawn”: in the latter, the original version’s Chinese invaders are replaced by North Koreans. The authors state that current references to China or its people are “conspicuously flattering or gratuitous additions designed to satisfy Chinese business partners and court audiences in the largest moviegoing market outside the U.S.” They also report that Chinese bad guys are disappearing and being replaced by positive depictions. They quote a movie executive who refused to be named: “It’s a clear-cut case—maybe the first I can think of in the history of Hollywood—where a foreign country’s censorship board deeply affects what we produce.”

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(6.) Foucault (1980: 122) states: “I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state ... the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations.”

(7.) When I mentioned this to a colleague who works in the field, he recounted that a delegation of Chinese students came to his office to demand that he remove a Tibetan flag displayed there. He responded that it is his office, and he has a right to decorate it as he wishes and that they should feel free to display PRC flags in their offices. They were adamant that he does not have a right to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and must remove it immediately in order to correct the harm he has done to their collective psyche.

(8.) In light of the fervent and deeply felt convictions that Chinese express regarding Tibet, it is worth noting that the earliest usage of the term “propaganda” was when Pope Gregory XV established the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide in 1622 following the Counter-Reformation. Its mandate, as the Latin name implies, was to propagate and defend the Church’s version of orthodoxy in the face of the Protestant challenge.

(9.) Catalogue of Chinese Publications in Tibetan Studies
Compilation Committee (1995, 1997).

(10.) In a useful survey of the field in the PRC, Chen and Wang (2008) state that there are now more than 3,000 academics specializing in Tibetology and more than a dozen government-funded research institutes devoted to the field (which significantly surpasses the total number of non-Chinese Tibetologists and Tibetan studies departments). There are a number of journals devoted to Tibetology, but most of the articles contained in them are short and formulaic. Few contain what would be regarded as research in the West; they are generally only a few pages in length, do not cite sources, have no original material, and merely repeat established platitudes. It is not clear why they are written, because they contain nothing new and simply record agreement with the

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established Party line. This might be their purpose: to put in writing one's wholehearted embrace of ideological orthodoxy.

(11.) In 2006 Beijing undergraduates were shown the iconic "tank man" photo, in which a lone pro-democracy protestor stood in front of tanks in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The students had no recognition of the photo. Some opined that it must be something that happened in a foreign country. This is discussed on the PBS website: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman/themes/erasehistory.html>.

(12.) Chan (2011). Chan's account is fictional, but as Barnett (2008) demonstrates, it closely parallels actual procedures among the PRC elite. Barnett examines a book published by former Party Secretary Chen Kuiyuan that includes secret communications relating to the Panchen Lama incidents of 1995. These discuss how events that were purportedly spontaneous were really carefully planned in advance and how the entire process of the PRC's choice of its Panchen Lama was stage-managed. Some of Chen's comments eerily parallel those of Chan's fictitious Party official. Chen lays out the methods used to obscure what really happened and to create a false set of beliefs in the general public.

(13.) Phoenix Arizona GOP Debate, December 7, 1999, http://www.ontheissues.org/Archive/GOP_Phoenix_China.htm.

(14.) Brady (2008: 137).

(15.) Blum (2007: 110).

(16.) Ellul (1973: 83). This is an aspect of what he terms "sociological propaganda," a generalized climate of opinion and acceptance of official ideology.

(17.) Ellul (1973: 83).

(18.) This is the refrain of a popular song, which is discussed by Bräuner (2009:19-20) and Barmé (1996a: 261-263). Barmé (1999:117-120) reports an incident of parody of this song, suggesting that there may be skepticism in some quarters regarding the message. This theme and ways in which the Party works to create a sense of legitimacy among the populace are discussed by Burton (2008: 146-160). The lyrics

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and context are analyzed by Victor Mair in "Language Log," August 4, 2011, <http://languageelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3340>.

(19.) Lasswell (1927: 221).

(20.) Shabo (2008: 36) discusses the use of false dilemmas for propaganda. This technique involves presenting a small number of alternatives and asserting that only one is viable.



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